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DEVELOPMENTS IN WELFARE LAW:
AFDC SHELTER REDUCTIONS
THOMAS M. WALSH*
Public assistance programs have long stimulated controversy. Vir-
tually every year courts have been faced with challenges to state legisla-
tion that attempts to terminate or reduce public assistance benefits.'
One relatively new and extremely volatile area of litigation is shared
housing. In dealing with this issue in the past, the courts have con-
sistently refused to allow states to shorten their welfare rolls or reduce
their budgets by conclusively presuming that recipients who share
housing have either reduced need or more available income.2
In 1974 the courts heard challenges in two of the nation's largest
welfare states, New York and California,3 to legislation that attempted
to reduce assistance to recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) 4 who were sharing housing. In Van Lare v. Hur-
ley' and Cooper v. Swoap6 the courts invalidated such reductions and
cast what may have been the final blow to legislation attempting to
reduce AFDC benefits based on shared housing in the absence of a
legal obligation to support. After a short review of the law as to
shared housing, this Note will focus on the impact of Van Lare and
Cooper and discuss the remaining alternatives by which reductions
may still be effected.
*B.A., Wabash College, 1973, J.D. (expected), Washington University, 1976.
1. This increase in the amount of welfare litigation is due in large part to the
recognition of the recipient's right to challenge state welfare procedures and the
establishment of the OEO Legal Services Program. Developments in Welfare Law
-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859, 861-62 (1974).
2. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); cases cited notes 42-44 infra.
3. New York, California and Pennsylvania had the largest caseloads in 1971.
Lurie, Estimates of Tax Rates in the AFDC Program, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 93, 99
(1974).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
5. 421 U.S. 338 (1975).
6. 11 Cal. 3d 856, 524 P.2d 97, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974).
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I. THnE AFDC STATUTE AND PRIOR DECISIONS
The AFDC program was begun in 1935 to provide assistance to chil-
dren deprived of parental support.7 It is but one of four categorical
public assistance programs rendering help to the needy.8 By design it
is a program of "cooperative federalism," whereby financing is fur-
nished by the state and federal governments on a matching fund
basis.10 The administration of the program, however, is left almost
exclusively to the states.
While participation in the program is voluntary, every state has
chosen to take part in the program, and forty-nine states provide a
separate shelter allowance within the scheme."1 The participating
7. Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1974). E.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968) (protec-
tion of child paramount goal); Holloway v. Parham, 340 F. Supp. 336, 342 (N.D.
Ga. 1972) (paramount goal to protect needy and dependent children); Woods v.
Miller, 318 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (primary object of AFDC to
encourage care of dependent child in his home or in another home); Norton v.
Lavine, 74 Misc. 2d 590, 344 N.Y.S.2d 81, 91 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (protection of
child paramount goal). For a comprehensive study of the history of the AFDC
program see W. BELL, Am TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965).
8. There are three other aid programs under the Social Security Act: Old Age
Assistance, Social Security Act §§ 101-06, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1970) (OAS);
Aid to the Blind, id. §§ 1001-06, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (AB); Aid to the Per-
manently and Totally Disabled, id. §§ 1151-55, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55 (ATD).
9. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
10. The federal government pays the majority of each states' total regular ex-
penditures for AFDC. Social Security Act § 403(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. §
603(a) (1) (A) (1970). The state's share, although a small portion, may still be
quite substantial in light of the recent rise in total expenditures. See note 21 infra.
11. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311, 316-17 (1968); Boucher v. Minter, 349
F. Supp. 1240, 1242 n.2 (D. Mass. 1972); Social Security Act §§ 401-02, 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-02 (1970); 20 MERCERP L. REv. 325, 326-27 n.12 (1969).
States employ either the flat grant or allowance system to compute the level of
their AFDC payments., Under a flat grant system, the schedule of payments is
based on family size. Throughout the state, every family of the same size will re-
ceive an equal grant, less any other income the particular family is receiving.
There is no consideration of the individual needs of each family. For additional
explanation of the validity and mechanics of the flat grant system see Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), and Houston Welfare Rights Organization, Inc. v.
Vowell, 391 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
Under an allowance system, the state department of welfare determines the
amount each family is to receive, which is the sum of that family's actual expendi-
tures for budgeted items. Indiana's statute is typical:
The amount of assistance which shall be granted for any dependent child
shall be determined by the county department with due regard to the re-
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states must submit a plan' to the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW) for approval. 13 The Act requires HEW to approve
the state plan, as long as it does not contravene any of the federal
criteria. 14 Central to a determination of the state plan's adherence to
federal criteria is the requirement that states furnish aid with "reason-
able promptness to all eligible individuals."'1
The AFDC program is designed particularly to benefit those children
who have "been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the
death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental in-
capacity of the parent."'16 Aid is furnished as long as the child resides
with a relative and is under the age of eighteen, or until age twenty-
one if the child is attending school.17 Benefits in either situation are
granted only if a parent is absent from the home.s
sources and necessary expenditures of the family and the conditions existing
in each case... and shall be sufficient ... to provide the child with a rea-
sonable subsistence compatible with decency and health, taking into considera-
tion all needs essential to the well-being of the child.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-1-7-3 (Bums Supp. 1974). In determining the amount of
the grant, the department looks to various factors such as the age and sex of each
member of the family. Under the allowance system the legislature usually sets a
ceiling on the amount payable to the recipient each month.
12. 45 C.F.R. § 201.3 (1972), as amended, 45 C.F.R. § 233. 90(a) (1974).
13. Social Security Act § 402(b), 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1970). The New York
plan had been approved. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208, 1210 (2d Cir. 1974),
rev'd sub nom. Van Late v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975).
14. Social Security Act § 402(b), 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1970). Among the
criteria enumerated in § 602(a) are: (1) a mandatory plan in effect in all of the
political subdivisions of the state; (2) financial participation by the state; (3) a
single state agency either administering or supervising the plan; (4) provision for
a fair hearing for those whose claims are delayed or denied; (5) proper adminis-
trative methods (e.g., hiring of employees); (6) submission of reports requested
by the Secretary of HEW; and (7) consideration of income available to the child
in determining aid. Id. § 402(a), 42 U.S.C. 602(a) (Supp. III, 1973). For
a discussion of Condition X, a criterion added by HEW, under which state
plans were rejected if they imposed stricter eligibility requirements than the
Secretary considered rational in light of the purposes of public assistance, see Note,
Welfare's "Condition X," 76 YALE L.J. 1222 (1967).
15. Social Security Act § 402(a)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970); see
Note, AFDC Eligibility Conditions Unrelated to Need: The Impact of Dublino,
49 IND. L.J. 334, 335 (1974).
16. Social Security Act § 406(a) (10), 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (10) (1970).
17. Id. § 406(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (2) (1970); see Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 479 (1970) (Congress intended to help children through
the family structure).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970). Since 1961 aid has been available under the
unemployed parent program to children, both of whose parents are present in the
1975]
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A determination of eligibility depends primarily on the standard of
need set by the state. Since the program's inception, the states' auton-
omy in setting their own standards of need and levels of benefits has
been recognized.19 The clash between federal criteria and state plans
occurs when a state attempts "either to adopt more limited definitions
of the target category or to impose collateral conditions on eligibility."20
Because of the phenomenal rise in AFDC expenditures, 21 states have
sought various means to limit their expenses. An early method, sub-
home only if the child suffers deprivation because of the unemployment of his
father. Social Security Act § 407, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970). See Note, Social
Welfare Law After the "Man-in-the-House," What?-Is King v. Smith the Ans-
wer? 15 How. L.J. 265, 271 (1969).
19. H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 24 (1935); S. REP. No. 628,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 36 (1935); Note, Social Welfare After the "Man-in-the-
House" supra note 18, at 269-70. States are granted wide latitude in determin-
ing a family's standard of need. One author has summarized the states approach
as including:
(1) a standard amount for food, clothing, and other basic needs except shelter,
which varies according to the size of the family and, in some states, the age
and sex of the members;
(2) the actual amount paid for rent up to a maximum or, in some states, a
fixed amount regardless of actual rent; and
(3) an amount for special needs that arise for families in unusual circum-
stances, such as special diets and transportation to a doctor.
Lurie, supra note 3, at 94. States thus determine the amount of benefits to be
paid by either paying the entire difference between the standard of need and
countable income, a certain percentage of the difference, the difference between a
percentage of the standard of need and countable income, or a flat grant regard-
less of actual need. Id. at 95-96. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
note 11 supra.
20. Note, AFDC Eligibility Conditions Unrelated to Need, supra note 15, at
335-36.
21. In fiscal 1975 welfare expenditures increased 20%, with AFDO rolls, the
largest family assistance program, reaching a record high. An average of 3.3 mil-
lion families (11,078,000 individuals) received benefits monthly in fiscal 1975, a
5.6% increase over fiscal 1974. Similarly, benefits per recipient averaged $64.30 in
fiscal 1975, an increase of $7.05 over fiscal 1974. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct.
17, 1975, at 2B, col. 5.
This phenomenal rise in welfare expenditures comes on the heels of a 25 year
period in which expenditures had remained fairly stable. The dramatic rise began
during the Democratic administrations of the 1960's and has been attributed to the
political developments (e.g., civil rights, civil disorder, and expanded legal, medical
and community action programs) of that era. Steiner, Reform Follows Reality:
The Growth of Welfare, 34 PuB. INTERESa 47, 64-65 (1974). The problem of
increasing welfare costs is particularly acute in states that have statutory or con-
stitutional ceilings on the total amount that the state can spend on public welfare.
Note, What Remains of Federal AFDC Standards After Jefferson u. Hackney?, 48
IND. L.J. 281, 281 n.7 (1972). For a discussion of the recent federal response to
[Vol. 10:213
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sequently rejected by Congress, was the use of waiting lists, whereby
new applications were held pending a decrease in present recipients
or an increase in available funds.22 Another method was the "suitable
home" requirement that stood for twenty-five years until Congress acted
to remove this requirement in 1961 and 1962.23 More recently, states
have attempted to curtail AFDC costs by reducing the amount of assist-
ance given to each eligible family as well as by reducing the total num-
ber of eligible recipients. 24 The courts, however, have consistently
rejected states' attempts to eliminate or reduce the amount of assistance
to recipients through the technique of conclusively presuming that
"benefits" result from shared housing.
The first major challenge to such conclusive presumptions heard by
the Supreme Court was King v. Smith.25 AFDC recipients challenged
Alabama's "substitute father" regulation that declared an AFDC family
ineligible for benefits if the mother cohabited with an able-bodied
man.'- Under the state's rationale a "substitute parent" was a non-
absent parent within the meaning of the Social Security Act; since aid is
furnished only when a parent is continually absent from the home, no
aid need be furnished to families with which a man cohabits. 27
Neither of Alabama's asserted state interests were found sufficient to
uphold the regulation. First, although the Court recognized the validity
spiraling AFDC costs see Note, Relative Responsibility in AFDC: Problems Raised
by the NOLEO Approach---"If at First You Don't Succeed . . . .', 9 URBAN L.
ANN. 203 (1975).
22. See Social Security Act § 402(a)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970);
H.R. REP. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1949). See also Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 490 (1970) (Douglas J, dissenting).
23. The suitable home requirement required the caseworker's personal evalua-
tion of the quality of the welfare home, often including a judgment of the mother's
moral conduct. If the home was deemed unsuitable for the child, aid would not
be granted. Congressional amendments in 1961 and 1962 prohibited the termina-
tion of benefits based on the suitability of the home, but allowed removal of the
child to a more suitable environment. Note, What Remains of Federal AFDC
Standards After Jefferson v. Hackney?, supra note 21, at 283.
24. Id. at 281. See cases cited notes 42-44 infra.
25. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). For discussions of King see 18 Am. U.L. REv. 603
(1969) ; 18 BUFFALO L. RyV. 623 (1969); 4 Hv. Crv. RiGHTs-Crv. Lm. L. Rv.
167 (1968); 15 LoYoLA L. REv. 371 (1969); 47 N.C.L. Rav. 228 (1968); 47
Tx. L. Rav. 349 (1969).
26. Under the Alabama scheme sexual relations between the parties as infre-
quently as once every six months may have been sufficient to establish cohabita-
tion. 392 U.S. at 314.
27. Id. at 313. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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of Alabama's interest in regulating the morality of its citizens, it found
the regulation invalid as a flat denial of aid to needy children.2 8
Secondly, Alabama's asserted interest in placing informal marriages on
par with formalized marriages was also held invalid. The Court found
the two types of living arrangements totally unequatable in the con-
text of the AFDC program, since only the married father has a duty
to support the children.2 9 From this conclusion the Court reasoned
that the term "parent" in the Act 30 includes only those bearing a legal
support obligation.31
Although King invalidated the use of the man-in-the-house rules in
determining eligibility, twelve states continued to include the man-in-
the-house's income in the budget of the AFDC family, thereby reduc-
ing their benefits.3 2 In response to this situation, HEW promulgated
a regulation defining "parent" pursuant to King, both for establishing
eligibility and for determining the amount of assistance.3 3 The regu-
lation mandates that in the absence of a legal support obligation the
states consider only income that is actually and currently available to
support the child when determining the income and resources of the
recipient family.
28. 392 U.S. at 320; see 18 AM. U.L. REv. 603, 604-05 (1969).
29. 392 U.S. at 327.
30. Social Security Act § 406(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1) (1970); see text
at note 16 supra.
31. 392 U.S. at 329. The Court found repeated references in the Act's legisla-
tive history to "breadwinner," "wage-earner," and "father" to describe the kind of
"parent" covered by the Act. Accordingly, the Court deduced that Congress had
intended to define "parent" as one legally obligated to support the child. Id. at
328. For the legislative history see H.R. REP. No. 615, supra note 19, at 10; S.
REP. No. 628, supra note 19, at 17-18.
32. Pollack, Man-in-the-House Rules After King v. Smith: New HEW Regula-
tions, 14 WELFARE L. BULL. 19, 21 (1968); Note, AFDC Income Attribution:
The Man-in-the-House and Welfare Grant Reductions, 83 HAv. L. Rav. 1370,
1377 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, AFDC Income Attribution].
33. 45 C.F.R. § 203.1, (1969), as amended, 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1974).
The regulation provides in part:
In establishing the financial eligibility and the amount of assistance payment,
only such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis
will be considered, and the income only of the parent described in the first
sentence of this paragraph [person legally obligated to support the child under
state law] will be considered available for children in the household in the
absence of proof of actual contributions.
(Vol. 10:213
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Several states thought the new HEW regulation conflicted with sec-
tion 402 (a) (7) of the Social Security Act, which requires states to
include the income of any individual whom the state determines should
be included.34 The states argued that the HEW regulation requires the
inclusion of the income of any person residing in the home. 35 The
Supreme Court, however, felt a careful reading of the regulation
showed that it was intended to include only "essential persons"-those
whose presence the state deemed beneficial to the AFDC family's
stability and were thus included in the recipient family's budget.3 6
Despite this seemingly definitive stance taken by the Court, the
states continued to use regulations based on shared housing to termi-
nate or reduce AFDC payments. The courts have relied heavily on
King and Lewis v. Martin- to invalidate subsequent state regulations
that employ shared housing restrictions, applying the reasoning in
those two cases to reduction as well as termination of benefits. 38 Under
34. The statute requires that in determining need the state must consider "any
other income and resources of any other individual ... living in the same home
. . . whose needs the State determines should be considered in determining the
needs of the child or relative claiming ... aid." Social Security Act § 402(a) (7),
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1970).
35. Note, AFDC Income Attribution, supra note 32, at 1377-78.
36. Shapiro v. Solman, 396 U.S. 5 (1969), aff'g 300 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn.
1969); see Note, AFDC Income Attribution, supra note 32, at 1378. In Sol-
man the Court invalidated a regulation that operated to terminate or reduce
benefits. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(vi) (1974).
37. 397 U.S. 552 (1970). Lewis followed King, holding that in determining
the resources available to the child California could not consider the income of a
non-adopting stepfather or man-adopting-the-role-of-spouse, since he had no
legal obligation to support the child. At the core of these decisions is the con-
cept that the federal objective of aiding the needy dependent child is paramount.
This mandates the finding that a reduction is as violative of federal policy as a
termination, for the dependent child is just as likely to suffer in either case.
38. Shortly after King, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the invalida-
tion of a Connecticut regulation that presumed the income of a stepfather avail-
able to the AFDC family. Shapiro v. Solman, 396 U.S. 5 (per curiam), aff'g
300 F. Supp. 409 (D. Conn. 1969). The Connecticut regulation, unlike those at
issue in King and Lewis, did not mandate only a termination because of the step-
father's presence, but effectuated either a termination or a reduction of benefits
based on the stepfather's income level. The Court relied on King, in its per
curiam affirmance of the district court decision, thus making it clear that the
King rationale extends to reductions as well as terminations. Since then federal
and state courts have treated reductions and terminations alike, recognizing their
similar impact on the dependent child. Hausman v. Department of Institutions &
Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 314 A.2d 362 (1974), serves as a recent example. The
New Jersey regulation at issue in Hausman provided for a payment of $107.00
1975]
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this rationale courts have consistently invalidated regulations attempt-
ing to utilize a conclusive presumption that a person lodging in an
AFDC household contributes to the support of the family. The courts
have adamantly refused to recognize the states' "economies of scaleSD
argument, finding that absent an actual contribution by the lodger, the
recipient's expenditures remain unchanged.40 If a reduction in benefits
were effected absent a showing of actual contribution, the real object
of the program-the needy child-would suffer.41 State regulations that
employ conclusive presumptions have thus been invalidated, whether
they pertain to a non-legally responsible stepfather,42 a non-legally re-
sponsible relative,4 3 or a non-legally responsible unrelated person.44
The cases all seem to stand for the principle that only actual income
monthly per person for a household of two, but reduced the per capita payment
to $94.00 where the household was enlarged to three persons by the presence of a
non-eligible person. Id. at 205-06, 314 A.2d at 364. Relying on King and Lewis,
the court rejected the state's argument that its schedule simply reflected the
economies of scale, shelter costs remaining constant while the number of persons
living there increased. The court found the state's "economies of scale" theory to
be an impermissible irrebutable presumption that the lodger was paying his share
of the expenses. Id. at 207-08, 314 A.2d at 365-66. See, e.g., cases cited notes
42-44 infra.
39. "[U]nder the economies of scale theory, five persons living in a household of
six and contributing their share of total costs can live more cheaply than five per-
sons living in a household of five." Mothers & Childrens Rights Organization,
Inc. v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp. 298, 302 (N.D. Ind. 1973).
40. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georges, 312 F. Supp. 289, 291-92 (W.D. Pa. 1969);
Hausman v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 208, 314 A.2d
362, 365-66 (1974).
41. Hausman v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 208, 314
A.2d 362, 366 (1974); see note 37 supra.
42. Rosen v. Hursh, 464 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1972); Boucher v. Minter, 349 F.
Supp. 1240 (D. Mass. 1972); Gaither v. Sterret, 346 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ind.),
aff'd, 409 U.S. 1070 (1972); X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1970),
aff'd sub nom. Engleman v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23 (1971); Ojeda v. Hackney, 319
F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Soliman v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409 (D.
Conn.), aff'd, 396 U.S. 5 (1969).
43. Reyna v. Vowell, 470 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1972); Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F.
Supp. 587 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Jenkins v. Georges, 312 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Pa.
1969); People v. Gilbert, 1 Cal. 3d 475, 462 P.2d 580, 82 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1969);
cf. Rodriguez v. Vowell, 472 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1973); Owens v. Parham, 350
F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
44. Mothers & Childrens Rights Organization, Inc. v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp. 298
(N.D. Ind. 1973); Hausman v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 64 N.J.
202, 314 A.2d 362 (1974).
[Vol. 10:213
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may be considered when determining the amount of aid an AFDC
family is to receive.45
11. SHARED HOUSING WITH NON-RECIPIENTS
A. Van Lare v. Hurley
In light of the consistent and seemingly definitive stance taken by the
courts in the area of welfare grant reductions based on the "benefits"
of shared housing, one might expect that any reductions based on such
a conclusive presumption would be unacceptable. The Second Circuit,
however, recently accepted a novel justification for such a reduction.-
Although later reversed by the Supreme Court in Van Lare v. Hurley,47
the decision merits discussion as it raises interesting questions involving
both statutory interpretation and constitutional issues. At issue in
Van Lare was the validity of New York regulations reducing the shelter
allowance of AFDC families when non-recipients who are not legally
45. As an exception to this line of cases, the court in Tartaglio v. Department
of Institutions & Agencies, 102 N.J. Super. 592, 246 A.2d 483 (App. Div. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1000 (1969), allowed a state to consider a stepfather's in-
come available to the children to whom he owed no duty to support because he
had listed the children as dependents on his tax returns. A subsequent case, X v.
McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1970), suggested that Tartaglio was in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's later decision in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S.
552 (1970).
46. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Van
Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975). AFDC recipients originally challenged the
regulations in two federal district courts. Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Taylor v. Lavine, Slip. Op. No. 73-C-699 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
From an adverse judgment in each case, the government appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit consolidated the appeals
and reversed the district courts on the statutory issues, remanding the case for a
hearing by a three judge district court on the constitutional issues. Taylor v.
Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974). On remand a combined district court
for the eastern and southern districts of New York found that the regulations
violated due process. Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1974). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on the appeal from the
three judge district court, Van Lare v. Hurley, 419 U.S. 1046 (1975), and
granted certiorari on the Second Circuit's decision on the statutory issue, Taylor v.
Lavine, 419 U.S. 1046 (1975). The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Second Circuit and the judgment of the three judge district court was vacated
and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot. Van Lare v. Hurley, 421
U.S. 338, 342-44 (1975).
47. 421 U.S. 338 (1975), rev'g sub nom. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208
(1974).
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obligated to support the dependent children reside in the household.48
The regulations were challenged on constitutional grounds, 40 and on
the grounds of conflict with the Social Security Act and its implement-
ing regulations.50 The Second Circuit, reversing the district court,
found the state regulations consistent with the federal Act and regula-
tions and remanded for a determination of the constitutional issues. 1
Prior to Van Lare, regulations terminating or reducing benefits be-
cause of the presence of a non-recipient in the home had been stricken
as conclusive presumptions of income.5 2 The Second Circuit, however,
48. The challenged regulations provide in pertinent part:
A non-legally responsible adult or unrelated person in the household, who is
not applying for nor receiving assistance shall not be included in the budget
and shall be deemed a lodger .... In the event a lodger does not contribute
at least $15.00 per month, the family shelter allowance, including fuel for
heating, shall be a pro-rata share of the regular shelter allowance.
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.30(d), quoted in 497 F.2d at 1211.
When a female applicant or recipient is living with a male to whom she is not
married... his available income and resources shall be applied in accordance
with the following:
(iv) When the male is unwilling to assume the responsibility for the woman
or her children and there are no children of which he is the acknowledged or
adjudicated father, he shall be treated as a lodger in accordance with §
352.30(d).
18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.31(a) (3), quoted in 497 F.2d at 1210-11.
49. Plaintiffs alleged the regulations were unconstitutional under the due process
and equal protection clauses and that they violated the rights of privacy and
association. 497 F.2d at 1212.
50. Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Taylor v. Lavine,
Slip. Op. No. 73-C-699 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Hurley sustained the plaintiff's argument
that the New York regulations violated the federal Act and regulations by creating
a conclusive presumption of income. The district court in Taylor found the rea-
soning in Hurley convincing and adopted it, holding the state regulations invalid.
51. See note 46 supra; notes 71-88 and accompanying text infra.
52. The basis of all prior decisions, regardless of the various arguments for-
warded by the states, was that the only realistic way to view such regulations was
as a conclusive presumption of support. See cases cited notes 42-44 supra. Courts
have for some time frowned on conclusive presumptions. Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973) (irrebuttable presumption of non-residency when enrolled at a state
university if the legal address was outside the state during the year of admission
held invalid); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (irrebuttable presumption
that unwed father unfit for custody of natural child held invalid); Heiner v. Don-
nan, 285 U.S. 312 (1935) (irrebuttable presumption that gift made within two years
of death was made in contemplation of death not permissible since there were
other plausible explanations). Regulations creating a rebuttable presumption of
income have been held invalid if applied by state officials as though they were
conclusive. Mothers & Childrens Rights Organization, Inc. v. Stanton, 371 F.
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in adopting a new approach, reasoned that the presence of a lodger in
the home created a "fair inference" that the AFDC recipients were not
occupying all the space for which they paid rent.5 3 The court stated
that the objective of the New York regulations was to "insure that all
the beneficiaries of an AFDC grant are entitled to enjoy it." Since
benefits were reduced and not terminated, the regulations merely pre-
vented non-eligible persons from receiving free living space,54 insuring
that only recipients receive the benefit of the grant. Drawing an anal-
ogy to the situation in which an eligible family lodges in a non-elig-
ible person's home, the court pointed out that the state in either situa-
tion should pay only the eligible family's pro-rata share of the rent.55
To make the critical distinction between termination and reduction
the court distinguished King and Lewis by finding that New York's ob-
jective was more limited than that of Alabama or California. 6 The
court found New York's objective in providing aid only to eligible in-
dividuals to be "coextensive with the federal interest in allocating
AFDC appropriations only to eligible persons."5 7 Thus, the majority
found a clear distinction between regulations that completely cut off
benefits to eligible individuals and those such as New York's which
disabused non-eligibles' from receiving free living space and thereby
assured that benefits be paid only to eligible individuals.5s
Supp. 298 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Owens v. Parham, 350 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ga.
1972); Hausman v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 314
A.2d 362 (1974).
53. 497 F.2d at 1215. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text in!ra.
54. 497 F.2d at 1216. This interest was found "coextensive" with the federal
interest in allocating AFDC appropriations only to eligible persons. Id.
55. Id. at 1215. This analogy disregarded the recent decision in Battle v.
Lavine, 44 App. Div. 2d 307, 354 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1974). The regulation in
Battle reduced the eligible person's stipend if he resided in the home of a non-
legally responsible relative or friend. The Battle court found that though the
purpose of the regulation was to keep ineligibles from indirectly receiving aid the
inevitable result was "to reduce, perhaps drastically, the stipend for those who are
eligible," forcing them to use portions of their food and clothing allotments for
rent. Id. at 310, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
56. 497 F.2d at 1216. The court felt the New York regulations were more
limited than those at issue in King (Alabama) or Lewis (California), because
they did not terminate aid but merely reduced it so that non-recipients could not
receive indirect benefits. See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); note 37 supra.
57. 497 F.2d at 1216.
58. Id. See note 37 supra; note 65 infra.
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This interpretation of King and Lewis seems contorted. The essence
of these decisions is the definitive requirement that the dependent
child-the primary object of the program-is not to suffer. In King,
the Court found that the regulation reducing benefits because of the
consort's mere presence left the child unprotected since the paramour
was under no legal obligation to support him. The Court held that
such a presumption was unwarranted in light of the congressional
intent to provide meaningful economic security for the child.59
The majority justified the reduction on an economies of scale argu-
ment, that "per individual housing costs decrease as the number of
individuals living together increases." 0 Thus, it reasoned that the
housing costs of the recipient family are reduced when a non-recipient
resides in the household.0 1 This is admittedly true when the lodger
makes an actual contribution of support. The mere presence of a
lodger, however, does not conclusively show that the AFDC family's
expenses have been diminished, for "economies of scale" do not reduce
total cost. Absent an actual contribution, the recipient family's ex-
penses remain the same. Thus, if there is a reduction in the shelter
allowance without a corresponding contribution from the lodger, the
dependent child is very likely to suffer.02
The Second Circuit sidestepped this argument by finding a "fair
inference" of a reduced standard of need, rather than a conclusive pre-
sumption of income. It was reasoned that the presence of the lodger
"evidences the recipient family's diminished need for housing space." 03
Supposedly, the housing needs of the AFDC family and the lodger are
separable, thus allowing the state to reduce shelter payments to reflect
only that part of the rental unit occupied by the recipient family. But
the "fair inference" is in actuality nothing more than a conclusive pre-
sumption of income, since the only pertinent consideration is the
presence of a lodger-the size or use of the space within the rental unit
is irrelevant.64
59. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 329-30 (1968).
60. 497 F.2d at 1215. But see note 38 supra.
61. 497 F.2d at 1215-16.
62. The dissent notes that "if the state reduces the rent allowance, the difference
will either be made up out of the food budget-literally out of the child's mouth-
or it will not be made up, resulting in eviction." Id. at 1222 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1215.
64. "Labeling the New York regulation a 'fair inference' does not change its
conclusive nature where a showing contrary to the inference will not affect the
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The Second Circuit obviously did not feel itself bound by the reason-
ing adopted in prior cases. s This approach can only be viewed as an
attempt to meet the welfare problems head on. Public opposition has
been aroused by the rising costs of public assistance programs, led by
AFDC,"" and the initial reaction has been to search out possible in-
eligibles on the welfare rolls.67 The judiciary is no less aware of prob-
lems in the poverty programs than are the legislative and executive
branches of government, and it may be credited with many of the
advancements.s The Second Circuit's majority apparently viewed
the New York regulation as a fair method of preventing indirect bene-
fits from accruing to ineligible persons, while avoiding the pitfalls of
a case-by-case factual determination. The court, however, seems to
have characterized the question as one of excess space rather than
income attribution. This characterization overlooks certain prob-
lems that the regulation shares with the income attribution theory.
Specifically, the characterization fails to come to grips with the
shelter allowance reduction; here the only fact considered by the state in the fair
hearing is the presence or absence of a lodger, not the amount of space in the
apartment." Id. at 1219 (Oakes, J. dissenting). Thus the inference may not re-
flect the actual living arrangement. See note 74 and accompanying text infra.
See also 88 Hxv. L. Rav. 654, 658 (1975).
65. See notes 37-38, 42-44 supra. Although not cited in the majority opinion of
the Second Circuit, the court's position is supported by language in Dullea v. Ott,
316 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Mass. 1970), suggesting that welfare benefits can be reduced
because of the mere presence of a non-recipient in the household. Since Dullea was
decided on other grounds, this language is dictum.
66. See note 21 supra.
67. Davidson, Government Role in the Economy: Implications for the Relief of
Poverty, 48 J. URBAN4 L. 1, 61-62 (1970); Krause, Child Welfare, Parental
Responsibility and the State, 6 FAMiLy L. Q. 377 (1972).
68. "It is the participation of the courts that has brought the rule-making
process to life .... Instead of the legislative and executive branches providing the
initiative for the creative development of new rules, with the courts imposing a
restraining hand when necessary, it has been the courts that have supplied the
initiative and in some measure, the creativity." Barrett, The New Role of the
Courts in Developing Public Welfare Law, 1970 DuxE L.J. 1, 23.
69. On remand the district court discussed the work of Professor Herbert Gans
of Columbia University, who noted the prevalence of the "doubling-up" phenome-
non, in which the poor take in other poor people as lodgers. These lodgers "help
out in the family in various ways in lieu of paying rent, helping to raise the
children, taking care of the house, doing a variety of things." Professor Gans ex-
plained that its prevalence is due to the insecure and chaotic sector of society in
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lifestyle of the poor, 9 and does not acknowledge that the specific
information necessary for individual determinations is already on file."°
On remand for consideration of the constitutional issues, the three-
judge district court7 ' accepted the Second Circuit's characterization of
the problem as one of excess space.7 2 The three judge court rejected
the notion that there was a fair inference of reduced need in the regu-
lation, however, finding that in reality it created alternative irrebut-
table presumptions. First, the regulation presumed that a recipient
family housing a noncontributing lodger actually needs less space and,
consequently, needs less money to pay for it. Alternatively, the regu-
lation presumed that, even if the recipient family cannot subsist in
less space, it somehow needs less money to pay its share of the rent.73
In considering the first presumption, the three judge court found
that an AFDC family housing a noncontributing lodger may not need
less space for its own use. "The lodger may be an older child sharing a
single or bunk bed with a younger sibling, or a disabled relative sleep-
ing on the couch. If the lodger is the mother's adult male companion,
he may be sharing the mother's own bed."7 4 Moreover, the court argued
that even if the family needed less space it is not likely that they could
find a smaller habitable apartment.7 5 The second argument, however,
carries little weight in light of the operation of the regulation. There
is no need for the recipient family to move into smaller housing once
its shelter allowance is reduced because if the lodger either moves out
or is evicted by the recipient family, the full allowance will be re-
stored.76 The court could have better attacked the first presumption
which the poor live. Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167, 171-73 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1974).
70. The dissenting opinion at the Second Circuit points out that an initial de-
termination of actual need and resources is already required by other New York wel-
fare regulations and that this information is continually updated. Thus, "it is absurd
to create an administrative presumption concerning resources of income or space,
when the actual information is on file and subject to immediate verification."
497 F.2d at 1220 n.11 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
71. Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1974). Plaintiffs
alleged the regulations were unconstitutional under the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses and that they violated the rights of privacy and association. Id. at 169.
72. Id. at 169.
73. Id. at 173-76.
74. Id. at 173.
75. Id.
76. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208, 1219 n.8 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, sub nom.
Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975).
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on the basis of the anomalous operation of the regulation. It makes
little sense to restore the full shelter allowance if there has been a
showing that the family is occupying excess space.
The court found the alternative presumption equally objectionable.
To assume that the presence of the lodger evidences a need for less
money (since the family must pay only its pro-rata share of the rent),
one must also assume that the lodger is actually paying his share of the
expenses. The three judge court summarily found this presumption
violative of federal law, citing the Second Circuit's opinion." The dis-
trict court majority simply carried the Second Circuit's reasoning one
step further and managed to turn the table on it.s
Finding the two irrebuttable presumptions without basis in fact, the
court had little difficulty finding them violative of procedural due
process.7- Quoting recent Supreme Court decisions the district court
stated the rule that irrebutable presumptions have long been dis-
favored and are unconstitutional when not universally true and when
there is a reasonable means of making the crucial determination. 80
Since existing New York regulations already provided for a "fair hear-
ing," the court held that a reasonable means of making the individual
77. 380 F. Supp. at 175, citing Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208, 1215 (2d
Cir. 1974).
78. Judge Hays, who wrote the majority opinion for the Second Circuit,
sat by designation with the district court on remand. He dissented on re-
mand, implying rather pointedly that the Second Circuit might not find the "fair
inference" unconstitutional. Apparently there is a high level of tension between
the two courts as to the propriety of these regulations.
79. 380 F. Supp. at 173-77. The court found the sex discrimination challenge
without merit. Although the term "male" was present in the regulation the court
found the language superfluous in light of early language holding "persons"
responsible. Id. at 176. The court then ruled that the state has a legitimate
interest in determining whether a lodger's presence in fact reduces the recipient's
shelter needs, and dismissed the free association and privacy claims. Id. Finally,
the court found that the equal protection claim overlapped the due process claim,
and that a separate decision on the equal protection ground was therefore un-
necessary. Id. at 176-77.
Very few opinions dealing with presumptions of income have turned on a con-
stitutional determination. See Boucher v. Minter, 349 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Mass.
1972). But see Owens v. Parham, 350 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ga. 1972). The issue
has never been decided by the Supreme Court, although in King Justice Douglas
concurred on constitutional grounds. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
80. 380 F. Supp. at 173, quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 644 (1974), and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). See also
notes 38-45 and accompanying text supra.
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determinations was available.81 Additionally, the court found a "prop-
erty" right in the recipient's statutory entitlement- to an allowance
commensurate with actual need. 2 Thus, to deny the individual "the
essential procedural right to challenge the purported factual basis of a
determination adversely affecting his own liberty or property" was held
to be a denial of due process.83
Judge Hays, in dissent, found the Second Circuit's opinion on statu-
tory grounds to control the constitutional issues. s4 He argued that
either the lodger has the means to pay his own way or he does not.
Assuming the former, Judge Hays saw no due process violation in abat-
ing the recipient's shelter allowance to reflect payment of the lodger's
pro-rata share.8 5 This does not mean, however, that the lodger is in
fact paying his share of the expenses.8 6 If, on the other hand, the
lodger is unable to pay his share, Judge Hays saw no constitutional
problem in forcing him to move out or go on welfare himself, causing
the recipient family's shelter allowance to be increased. 7 Whether this
suggestion would run afoul of the constitutionally recognized rights of
privacy and free association has not been settled."'
The Supreme Court's rejection of the Second Circuit's novel reason-
ing provided no surprises. Relying on King, Lewis and Townsend v.
81. 380 F. Supp. at 175. The New York regulation is 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 358.1-
.27, cited in 380 F. Supp. at 175. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656
(1972).
82. 380 F. Supp. at 175. See Note, Social Welfare-An Emerging Doctrine of
Statutory Entitlement, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 603, 629 (1969).
83. 380 F. Supp. at 175.
84. This is not surprising since Judge Hays wrote the majority opinion for the
Second Circuit. See note 78 supra.
85. 380 F. Supp. at 178 (Hays, J., dissenting).
86. This is exactly the situation the majority found in the second presumption
created by the statute. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra.
87. 380 F. Supp. at 178 n.2 (Hays, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 176. A federal district court found a violation of the right of privacy
in the analogous situation presented in Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agri-
culture, 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In
Moreno a statute denying food stamps to a household which included a person not
related to the recipient was held invalid. See Brief for Appellee at 28-29, Taylor
v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1974). Similarly, it can be argued that the
regulation threatens the right of free association by penalizing a recipient for re-
siding with a non-recipient. Id. at 29. But cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974); note 79 supra.
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Swank,69 the Supreme Court, in a short opinion, reversed the Second
Circuit's decision, finding that the New York regulations did in fact
create a conclusive presumption. - The Court found invalid the state's
argument that the presence of a lodger evidenced excess space, since if
the lodger moved out the full allowance was restored.91 Additionally,
the Court rejected the state's argument that the reduction prevented
non-recipients from indirectly receiving benefits. While this is unde-
niably a meritorious goal, the state is not allowed to achieve it at the
expense of the needy child."!
B. What Alternatives Remain After Van Lare?
The Supreme Court's decision in Van Lare seemingly forecloses the
use of any regulation establishing a conclusive presumption in the
absence of a legal obligation to support the AFDC family. This is true
whether the regulation is interpreted as presuming either less need on
the part of the family or a contribution from the lodger. It is doubtful,
however, that we have seen the end of legislative attempts to reduce
benefits when a lodger is present in the welfare home. Successful legis-
lation would be of great practical importance in reducing welfare rolls
since there are many AFDC households in which a non-recipient is
present.0-
States remain free, of course, to reduce benefits by implementing
similar regulations based on rebuttable presumptions.94 Rebuttable
presumptions would merely shift the burdens of proof and of coming
89. 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (state provision adding an eligibility requirement con-
flicting with the federal statute violates the supremacy clause).
90. Van Late v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975). This holding rendered a
decision on the constitutional issues moot. The lone dissenter, Justice Rhenquist,
felt the regulation did not conflict with the federal statutes, basing his opinion on
the majority opinion in Taylor. Reaching the constitutional issues, he found the
regulations permissible relying on the dissenting opinion in Hurley v. Van Lare,
380 F. Supp. 167, 177 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1974). In both instances he is relying on
the opinions written by Judge Hays. See note 78 supra.
91. 421 U.S. at 347. See note 64 supra.
92. 421 U.S. at 347-48.
93. New Jersey recently estimated that nearly one-third of its AFDC homes
were composed of recipient and non-recipient residents. Hausman v. Department
of Institutions & Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 209-10, 314 A.2d 362, 366 (1974).
94. See Mothers & Childrens Rights Organization, Inc. v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp.
298 (N.D. Ind. 1974); Owens v. Parham, 350 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ga. 1972);
Hausman v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 314 A.2d 362
(1974).
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forward with evidence to the recipient. 95 They are compatible with the
federal purposes of the AFDC program, and have been held to be
objective and equitable:
The state avoids paying funds not necessary under its definition
of need; administrative efficiency is furthered; the welfare budget
is protected for other needy recipients; and assistance groups liv-
ing with nonrecipients not in fact sharing household expenses
are protected by their rights to rebut the assumed sharing of
expenses.9 6
As a method of lowering welfare expenditures and assuring that
only eligible persons receive benefits, the rebuttable presumption is at
best an unattractive compromise for the states. Since the rebuttable
presumption places no obligation on the lodger to pay his pro-rata
share of the expenses, no net saving of state funds can be effected.0' If
anything, the rebuttable presumption would encourage the lodger to
refrain from making monetary contributions to the AFDC family,
since, absent such contributions, the family's benefits remain undimin-
ished. Thus, the lodger can keep all of his earnings while receiving
free living accommodations, and cause no reduction of the recipient
family's shelter allowance. Under these circumstances it is difficult to
imagine that many lodgers would choose to make monetary contribu-
tions for their share of the rent.
The answer to the dilemma lies in establishing an independent
statutory duty on behalf of the (non-recipient) lodger to contribute at
least his pro-rata share of the shelter expenses. A California statute
exemplifies this approach:
95. Hausman, v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, 64 N.J. 202, 209-10,
314 A.2d 362, 366 (1974), found this burden reasonable: "The obligation of an
original applicant for assistance or of a recipient, when the addition of a non-
eligible to the household occurs and a reduction in assistance is proposed, to come
forward with the facts is not an undue one."
96. Mothers & Childrens Rights Organization, Inc. v. Stanton, 371 F. Supp. 298,
305 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
97. When the life style of the poor is considered, it becomes apparent that few
lodgers will actually contribute to the expenses:
So, quite frequently you do get a pattern among poor people, if they can't
work or they can't find work either temporarily or permanently, of moving in
with a relative, either temporarily or permanently, because there simply isn't
any money to establish or continue to maintain one's own household. And
typically, then, the people then become lodgers, help out in the family in
various ways in lieu of paying rent, helping to raise the children, taking care
of the house, doing a variety of things. I think that's one major explanation.
Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167, 171 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1974), quoting Pro-
fessor Herbert Gans, sociology professor at Columbia University.
(Vol. 10:213
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol10/iss1/6
AFDC SHELTER REDUCTIONS
Whenever an unrelated adult male resides with a family applying
for or receiving aid under this chapter, he shall be required to
make a financial contribution to the family which shall not be
less than it would cost him to provide himself with an independ-
ent living arrangement. 8
If the lodger continues to reside with the AFDC family and is finan-
cially unable to make the necessary contribution, the California regu-
lations subject him to prosecution under a statute making it a misde-
meanor for those other than needy children knowingly to receive or use
AFDC funds.10
This statute withstood constitutional attack on equal protection and
due process grounds in Russell v. Carleson.100 The plaintiffs in Rus-
sell" , claimed that the statute imposed a "'special obligation on the
unrelated man [UAM] to affirmatively support the welfare family.' "102
Specifically, they alleged the statute was sexually discriminatoryo3 and
that the contribution was fictionally calculated. 0 4 The court found no
98. CALIF. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11351.5 (Deering 1969). The statute
exempts bona fide paying lodgers, roomers or boarders. In determining the mini-
mum financial contribution, the statute considers the adult male's income and ex-
penses. The statute further requires that the child's mother and the unrelated
adult male sign, under penalty of perjury, a statement of the conditions connected
with the sharing of expenses. If either party willfully fails to cooperate, aid to the
family may be discontinued. Since the termination provision seems to provide an
added eligibility requirement it might be invalid under the King rationale. See
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971).
99. Cal. SDSW Manual EAS §§ 20-101.21 to .22, 43-114.3, cited in Russell
v. Carleson, 36 Cal. 3d 334, 339-40, 111 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500 (Ct. App. 1973).
The statute provides: "Any person other than a needy child, who willfully and
knowingly receives or uses any part of an aid grant paid [under the AFDC program]
for a purpose other than the support of the needy child and the caretaker [e.g.,
mother] involved, is guilty of a misdemeanor." CALIF. WVELF. & INST. CODE §
11480 (Deering 1969).
100. 36 Cal. App. 3d 334, 111 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Ct. App. 1973).
101. Plaintiffs were both recipient mothers of dependent children living with
unrelated adult males. The regulations defined an unrelated adult male as a male
21 years of age or older and unrelated by blood or marriage to any member of the
AFDC family. Id. at 338 n.2, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 499 n.2.
102. Id. at 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
103. "In particular the plaintiffs assert that the statute and regulations uncon-
stitutionally discriminate against UAMs living with AFDC mothers while requiring
no like contribution from adult relatives living with AFDC families or from un-
related adult females living with male heads of AFDC households, or from UAMs
living with non-AFDC mothers." Id. at 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02.
104. The court viewed this argument as the fulcrum of the constitutional attack
-"namely, why is the uniform standard calculated on the fiction that plaintiffs are
living apart when in fact they are in a sharing arrangement?" Id. at 341-42, 111
Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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merit in the discrimination claim, reasoning that the regulation was at
the very least a reasonably appropriate method of protecting the AFDC
grant,105 and that the legislature could justifiably have found that this
classification posed the greatest threat to diversion of the grant.100 The
court found no merit in the challenge to the "fictional computation,"
reasoning that if the lodger contributed merely his pro-rata share "he
would in effect be using the AFDC grant because the grant is what
made the sharing arrangement possible in the first place."10 7 Relying
on Dandridge v. Williams,108 the court properly found the standard of
contribution created by the statute to be "a reasonable reconciliation
of the realities and federal requirements."'0 9
The distinction in the California Act between related and unrelated
persons may have some rational basis and therefore be supportable
against an equal protection challenge. A state might well determine
that the presence of an adult related to the AFDC recipients provides
some stabilizing influence in the home. A state may also find some
rational basis in assuming this person would better serve as a "sub-
stitute parent" to the child than an unrelated adult, thereby making
his presence in the home more socially justifiable."10
The distinction between male and female lodgers, however, is more
tenuous. It is obvious that this statute provides "dissimilar treatment
for men and women who are thus similarly situated.""' Since the
classification is based on sex alone, the legislature's attempt to deal
with the problems "one at a time" may be insufficient to satisfy recent
and more stringent constitutional tests. In Frontiero v. Richardson,"1
a Supreme Court decision handed down prior to Russell, the plurality
105. The court found the statute met the due process test announced in People
v. Agular, 257 Cal. App. 2d 597, 602, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174 (Ct. App. 1968)
("reasonably related to promoting the public health, safety, comfort, and welfare,
and if the means adopted to accomplish that promotion are reasonably appropriate
to the purpose"). 36 Cal. App. 3d at 343, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
106. To justify this position the court relied on Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535, 546-47 (1972):
A legislature may address a problem "one step at a time," or even "select one
phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others." . . . So
long as the judgements are rational, and not invidious, the legislature's efforts
to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a con-
stitutional strait jacket.
107. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 345, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
108. 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
109. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 345, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
110. See note 36 and accompanying text supra; notes 69, 97 supra.
111. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
112. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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opinion suggests that sex may be a suspect classification"13 subject to
the rigors of strict scrutiny. " 4 Applying the rationale of Frontiero,
which had been ignored by the Russell court, it is doubtful that the
state could find a sufficient interest to justify sexual discrimination in
the statute."*
The obvious and simple solution to the discrimination problem
would be the substitution of the word "person!' for the word "male."
A state could also effect a more widespread application of the statute,
resulting in more numerous reductions in welfare benefits, by deleting
the word "unrelated." This would require all adult person§ residing
in an AFDC household to contribute an amount equal to what they
would spend if living alone, and would result in a tremendous savings
to the state. The state would thus be able to accomplish what the
regulation in Van Lare failed to achieve.""
This type of statute would solve the courts' problems with conclusive
presumptions, which were rejected because of the absence of a legal
support obligation."17 By placing a legal duty on the lodger to con-
tribute at least his share of the expenses, the state may well be free to
113. Id. at 687. In a recent district court opinion, United States v. Reiser,
394 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Mont. 1975), sex was held to be a suspect classification.
Id. at 1063-65. Whether a majority of the Supreme Court would find sex to be a
suspect classification today is questionable. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351,
355 (1974). For the views of one commentator who believes sex should be a
suspect classification and subject to strict scrutiny see Comment, Are Sex-Based
Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 481 (1971).
114. Justice Brennan, speaking for the plurality, detailed the rigors of the strict
scrutiny test: "And when we enter the realm of 'strict judicial scrutiny' there can
be no doubt that 'administrative convenience' is not a shibboleth, the mere rec-
itation of which dictates constitutionality." 411 U.S. at 690.
115. An additional blow to the statute would be ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment, 86 Stat. 1523.
116. In an allowance system, this type of regulation could cause a reduction in
the shelter allowance commensurate to the contribution made by the lodger. In a
flat grant system, however, it might generate income only to the extent it exceeds
the lodger's pro-rata share of the expenses because individual determinations of
need are not permissible in the flat grant approach. If, therefore, the benefits of
shared housing are considered when the recipient's standard grant is calculated,
there could be no reduction for the contribution of the lodger's pro-rata expenses.
Any reduction based on this amount would be an impermissible individual determi-
nation of need. Any contribution in excess of the pro-rata share could be con-
sidered income and properly deducted. See notes 123-26 and accompanying text
infra.
117. See, e.g., Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975); Lewis v. Martin,
397 US. 552 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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"presume" that the recipients receive this amount from the lodger. A
regulation presuming additional income to the recipient family in this
amount might still be subject to attack since federal regulations allow
a reduction only when there is actual income.11 8 But considering the
courts' preoccupation in these cases with the absence of a legal obliga-
tion to contribute to the support of the family, the inference is clear
that the imposition of a legal duty to contribute may be sufficient to
establish the presumption that payments are being made."10
California has used still another approach in attempting to generate
resources in the AFDC family-recognition of a wife's community
property interest in her husband's earnings.2 0 By granting the wife
management and control of her share of the community property, the
state presumes that this property is available for support of the de-
pendent children. 1 21 When this regulation was attacked, however, the
court found the presumption that the stepfather's income was available
to support the stepchildren impermissible. 12 Nevertheless the court
held that the wife's actual access to joint savings and checking accounts
was sufficient to make those accounts available for the child's support." 3
III. AFDC RECIPIENTS RESIDING WITH RECIPIENTS or OTHER
AID PROGRAMS - THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE
California enacted an extensive welfare reform bill in 1971124 which
provides a good example for a case study. A major provision of this
controversial legislation substituted a flat grant system of payments for
118. While the regulations provide that only income actually available on a
regular basis may be considered in determining the need of the recipient, it is
arguable that the requirement of actual income should be considered only in the
absence of a legal obligation to support. See note 33 supra.
119. See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
120. CAL. CirV. CODE § 5127.5 (Deering 1971).
121. Under this statute, the wife's interest extends only to the remainder of her
husband's income after the subtraction of prior support payments and a $300.00
gross monthly exemption. Zumbrun, Momboisse & Findley, Welfare Reform:
California Meets the Challenge, 4 PAcIFIc LJ. 739, 778 (1973).
122. Camp v. Carleson, No. 216154 (Super. Ct., Sacramento County, Calif.,
Feb. 15, 1972).
123. Id.
124. Welfare Reform Act of 1971, ch. 578 [1971] Cal. Stats. 1136. For a dis-
cussion of the viewpoints of the proponents and opponents of the legislation in the
California statehouse see Beilenson & Agran, The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, 3
PAcibc L.J. 475 (1972); Zumbrun, Momboisse & Findley, supra note 121.
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the administratively burdensome allowance system.12 5 To implement
this new system, the California Department of Social Welfare promul-
gated Eligibility and Assistance Standard (EAS) 44-115.9. This regu-
lation established monetary allowances for housing and utility needs
based on the number of recipients in the household.126 If, due to a
shared housing arrangement with an Adult Aid recipient, the pro-rata
share of the AFDC recipient's expenses fell below the allowance created
by EAS 44-115.9, EAS 44-115.8 required the difference to be treated as
"in-kind" income and subtracted from the AFDC grant. 727
The California Supreme Court, in Cooper v. Swoa p,"2 found both
the specific regulation'2 9 and the welfare department's general "non-
cash economic benefit" theory in direct conflict with the governing
statutes."10 The majority viewed EAS 44-115.8 as a re-evaluation of the
individual recipient's housing and utility needs. Underlying its opin-
ion is the premise that the California legislature, in the Welfare Re-
form Act of 1971, rejected the system of individual determinations"-
125. The legislature now determines a uniform standard of need and a uniform
payment. CALIF. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11450, 11452 (Deering Supp. 1973).
See note 11 supra.
126. Since we are now dealing with reductions caused by shared housing with
recipients of other aid programs it is important to note that the payment sched-
ule for Adult Aid recipients operates in a different manner in California. See
note 8 supra. In ATD housing needs are paid up to a maximum of $63.00 per
month. In AB and OAS a minimum housing allowance is granted plus a supple-
mental allowance up to a maximum of $63.00 in order to reflect actual expendi-
tures. The maximum for Adult Aid recipients who share housing, however, is
$45.00. Adult Aid recipients never receive more for housing than they actually
expend and up to a certain maximum their housing costs are paid in full. Brief
for Appellant at 5, Cooper v. Carleson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 502 (Ct. App. 1973).
127. Plaintiff Cooper, an ATD recipient, resided with her five children who
were all AFDC recipients. The family paid $88.00 monthly for housing and
utilities. Applying the pro-rata calculation required by EAS § 44-115.8, the
children's share was $70.00 (5/6 of $84.00). EAS § 44-115.9 provides an al-
lowance of $101.00 for five recipients, resulting in a $31.00 difference between
the pro-rata cost and the allowance. This difference was treated as "in-kind"
income and subtracted from the grant. Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 861
n.3, 524 P.2d 97, 99 n.3, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 n.3 (1974).
128. Id. at 856, 524 P.2d 97, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1.
129. ELIGIBILITY AND ASSISTANCE STANDARD § 44-115.8, cited in 11 Cal. 3d
at 860 n.2, 524 P.2d at 99 n.2, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 3 n.2.
130. 11 Cal. 3d at 863-64, 524 P.2d at 101, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
131. "In establishing a flat grant system, the Legislature consciously aban-
doned the previous practice under which welfare grants were set on the basis of
an administrative determination of need; instead, the Legislature took it upon
itself to set fixed grant levels to be paid to all recipients without regard to indi-
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in general, and in particular decisively rejected a section designed to
reduce AFDC benefits when the recipient shared housing with an Aid
to the Permanently and Totally Disabled recipient.18 2 In light of such
unambiguous legislative action the court held the state welfare de-
partment had overstepped its bounds in taking upon itself authority
to reject express legislative determinations, and in addition, found that
by labeling benefits derived from shared housing as "in-kind" income,
the department had camouflaged the true nature of its calculations.'33
Even if the regulation were not a smokescreen to re-evaluate need,
the court found that it impermissibly recognized such benefits as in-
come. Analysis of other statutes, legislative history, and prior regula-
tions convinced the court that California had never considered the
benefits of shared housing to represent income.134 Finally, the court
rejected the income theory on the basis that federal law allows only
vidual need." Id. at 859, 524 P.2d at 98, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 2. The court also
rejected the department's argument that the payment schedule had been calcu-
lated only on the basis of independent living arrangements: "[I]t is clear that
in devising section 11450's flat grant figures, the Legislature relied upon the
department's past payment schedule which did not distinguish between inde-
pendently housed units and AFDC units that shared housing with others." Id. at
865 n.13, 524 P.2d at 102 n.13, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 6 n.13.
132. A bill requiring that a portion of the benefits of an ATD recipient who
resided with an AFDC family be considered available to the AFDC family,
thereby causing a reduction in the AFDC grant, was decisively defeated both on
the Senate floor and in committee. Id. at 864, 524 F.2d at 101, 115 Cal. Rptr.
at 5. But see Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Super-
visors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 57-58, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 492 (Cal. App. 1968)
(unpassed bills offer little evidence of legislative intent).
133. "The department's desire to cut welfare expenses at any cost has led it
to disregard the clear guidelines of its legislative mandate and to construct a
contrived and tortured concept of 'income' in an attempt to camouflage an im-
permissible reevaluation of AFDC recipient's needs." 11 Cal. 3d at 872, 524 P.2d
at 107, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The department admitted that EAS § 44-115.8 was
designed to calculate actual housing needs of AFDC recipients: "It is only logi-
cal that the recipient should receive housing and utility allowances solely for ac-
tual needs." Brief for Respondents at 6, Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 524
P.2d 97, 115 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974).
134. Former EAS 44-115.61 expressly rejected the idea that partially free or
shared living costs represented income. Also, the court felt that had the legisla-
ture recognized any benefit from such arrangements it would have been repre-
sented in the legislative analyst's report on the financial consequences of the
Welfare Reform Act of 1971. Finally, the court considered CALIF. WnL.. &
INST. CODE § 11006, which prohibits the inclusion of an Adult Aid recipient's
benefits in anyone else's income. 11 Cal. 3d at 861-63, 524 P.2d at 103-05, 115
Cal. Rptr. at 3-5.
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actual available income to be deducted from the welfare grant"35 By
the operation of the California regulation only an average rather than
an actual figure is determined and deducted.- 6
The majority's logic seems unimpeachable, if, in fact, the legislative
determination of the standard payment included figures reflecting pay-
ments to those recipients who were sharing housing. The majority's
assertion that the maximum grant schedules were prepared with shared
housing arrangements in mind may, however, be disputed.137 If only
independent living arrangements were considered, the state would be
making double payments to the household. 3 8 This result is anomalous
in light of the overall purpose of the Reform Act.' 9
Cooper leaves untouched the question of the validity of a regulation
reducing benefits in a state which uses the allowance system. The court
dealt with the problem exclusively within California's flat grant sys-
tem."" It is quite probable, however, that the result would differ in a
135. See note 33 supra.
136. 11 Cal. 3d at 870-71, 524 P.2d at 105-06, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10.
137. Id. at 875, 524 P.2d at 109, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 13 (Burke, J., dissenting).
138. The economies of scale argument would retain at least partial validity
here, for although the Adult Aid recipient receives only his pro-rata share of the
shelter expenses, the AFDC family would be receiving its full grant.
139. In enacting the legislation the lawmakers were seeking to devise a new
welfare system in which no one could get more than his fair share. The legisla-
tors were motivated by reports of persons making as much as $800.00 per month
while drawing welfare. Beilenson & Agran, supra note 124, at 475-81. Further,
since a regulation designed to prevent duplicate welfare payments would promote a
legitimate state interest, it could withstand an equal protection attack:
It would be curious, indeed, if two "pockets" of the same government would
be required to make duplicating payments for welfare.
The administrative procedures to give effect to this process may be cum-
bersome, but the right of the State to avoid overlapping benefits for support
should be clearly understood.
Carleson v. Ramillard, 406 U.S. 598, 604 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Under the "double payment" rationale, the key to effecting reductions is simply
to calculate the standard grant on the basis of individualized housing. It is not
apparent, however, whether this would result in any significant savings to the
state. If the benefits of shared housing are not calculated in the averaging proc-
ess, the standard payment will certainly be higher. Whether the state could re-
capture more than this increase in payments is not clear. Id.
140. The majority chose not to reach the federal claims, although it touched
briefly on the question of whether the regulation measured the actual value of
the recipient's benefits. Relying on King and Lewis, the majority believed the
California regulation was invalid as an inaccurate measurement of income under
the federal statute. 11 Cal. 3d at 870-71, 524 P.2d at 105-06, 115 Cal. Rptr. at
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state using an actual standard of need. The problem in cases involving
non-recipients is the conclusive presumption of contribution created
by the regulation. 41 The state has no control over the resources of the
lodger and, absent a legal duty to contribute, cannot assure that an
actual contribution will be made. When the lodger is a recipient of
another aid program, however, the state usually has some power over
the recipient's expenditures.142 States generally retain the right to
appoint a trustee to receive the recipient's grant. The trustee, in turn,
pays the recipient's expenses. 43 Thus, even though a conclusive pre-
sumption might be created, the state has a means of insuring that the
conclusive presumption is based upon fact.
CONCLUSION
From a review of recent challenges to AFDC shelter reductions
based on shared housing two things are clear. First, because of the
large amounts of money involved, 44 and the pressure on states and
cities to become more fiscally responsible, states will continue to seek
means to trim their welfare expenditures. Secondly, it is apparent after
Van Lare and Cooper that courts will reject any method of reduction
whereby payments are lowered based on a conclusive presumption that
either "income" or other "benefits" result from shared housing with
either recipients or non-recipients in the absence of a duty to support.
The alternative of using a rebuttable presumption would be unaccept-
able to the states as it is very doubtful that meaningful savings could
9-10. Apparently this was dictum, however, for in the companion case to Cooper,
justice Tobriner, who wrote both majority opinions, limited the Cooper holding
to the state claims. Waits v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 887, 889, 524 P.2d 117, 115
Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974).
141. See notes 37-45 and accompanying text supra.
142. This control is not inconsistent with the "money payment" principle in-
corporated in Social Security Act § 406(b), 42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (1970). Under
that theory a recipient's grant is not identified with any particular requirement
nor designated for any specific purpose. The purpose of this scheme is to en-
courage responsible budgeting by the recipient. When recipients of different aid
programs reside together, however, the state has a legitimate interest in making
sure each recipient pays his share of the shelter expenses in order to avoid dou-
ble payments. See Carlson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 604 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
143. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-1-7.1-12 (Bums 1973); 62 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 512 (1967).
144. See note 21 supra.
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be effected through its use.1" On its face, then, it would appear that
only a statutorily imposed duty to contribute to the living expenses
as used in California might solve the problem. This solution, however,
has its drawbacks. The courts, while emphasizing the lack of a legal
obligation to support, have also spoken of a need for actual contribu-
tions to the recipient family.'" Whether they would be willing to
accept the legal obligation to contribute a ratable portion of the house-
hold expenses as a sufficient basis for a reduction is yet to be deter-
mined. It is dear that if courts were to accept a reduction based solely
on a legal obligation to contribute, an enforcement procedure would
have to exist to insure "meaningful protection."'' T Alternatively, the
state could restructure welfare policies whereby the "human" side of
the welfare problem is stressed,148 rather than viewing the welfare
recipient as merely a financial burden on the state. This view would
recognize the social benefits of shared housing as outweighing any
financial savings. But whatever solution is adopted it is assured that
the controversy will continue.
145. See notes 94-97 and accompanying text supra.
146. See notes 38-45 and accompanying text supra.
147. See Note, AFDC Income Attribution, supra note 32, at 1384-85.
148. See notes 69, 97 supra.
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